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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
tiff, as a matter of law, had waived his right to proceed in arbitration
under the agreement.17 4 The plaintiff opposed the motion on the
grounds that the relief requested by the defendant was inconsistent and
would deprive him of all remedies. 75 The Supreme Court, Albany
County, relying on case law and CPLR 2201 and 7503(a), held for the
defendant. 7 6
The Sowalskie case is apparently an anomaly. Subsequently, in A.
Burgart, Inc. v. Foster-Lipkins Corp.,177 it was held that commencing
an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien does not constitute a waiver of
the right of arbitration. Pointedly, the purpose of a stay of court action
is to force the parties to proceed to arbitration and thereby settle their
dispute.
CPLR 7503(c): Party estopped from objecting to time and method of
service of application to stay arbitration.
CPLR 7503(c) prescribes the procedure by which a party may move
to compel arbitration and the procedure that must be followed by the
opposing party if he wishes to stay arbitration. The latter requires a
party who has received a notice of intention to arbitrate which includes
a statement requiring any objection to be made within ten days to act
within ten days to stay arbitration or "be so precluded."
Prior to the Court of Appeals' interpretative ruling in Knicker-
bocker Insurance Co. v. Gilbert,178 there was much confusion regarding
the method of computing this ten-day period. In Knickerbocker, the
Court held that an application to stay arbitration posted on the tenth
day after receipt of a notice of intention to arbitrate was timely. 7 9 In
174 Id. at 666, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
175 Id.
176Id. at 666-67, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 488. CPLR 2201 merely provides: "Except where
othervise prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay
of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just." Moreover, the cases
cited by the court to support its denial of all relief to the plaintiff, River Brand Rice
Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 805 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953), and Application of Duke
Laboratories, 9 Misc. 2d 779, 168 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957), involved stays
of judicial proceedings granted after the time to demand arbitration had expired. As
noted by the Court of Appeals, denial of all relief is preferable to permitting a party to
wait until the contractual time limit for arbitration has expired before commencing
an action at law on a claim which he agreed to arbitrate. See River Brand Rice Mills v.
Latrobe Brewing Co., 805 N.Y. 36, 41, 110 N.E.2d 545, 547 (1958).
177 63 Misc. 2d 930, 313 N.YS.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1970) (mem.), aff'd
mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 779, 328 N.Y.S.2d 856 (4th Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 80 N.Y.2d
901, 287 N.E.2d 269, 835 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1972). The Burgart court held that the plaintiff had
a right to continue the lien which he had a statutory right to file without waiving arbitra-
tion, under N.Y. LiEN LAw § 85 (McKinney 1966).
178 28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 820 N.YS.2d 12 (1971), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Ra. 536, 550 (1971).
179 Id. at 64, 268 N.E.2d at 762, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
overruling State-Wide Insurance Co. v. Lopez, °80 Knickerbocker also
settled the question of who should be served with the application
for a stay, holding that if a party's attorney serves the notice of intention
to arbitrate, he impliedly becomes that party's agent for service of the
moving papers when the adverse party subsequently seeks to stay arbi-
tration.181
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Carrillo,82 the defendants served the
plaintiff, pursuant to CPLR 7503(c), with a notice of intention to arbi-
trate. Thereafter, the parties, by stipulation, twice agreed to extend the
statutory ten-day period to apply for a stay of arbitration. The plaintiff
subsequently made its application within the agreed period by an order
to show cause served by regular mail. The defendants contested the ap-
plication, contending that service of the application was deficient under
CPLR 7503(c) on three grounds: (1) that the defendants' attorney was
served, while the statute requires the defendants to be personally served;
(2) that in lieu of the required registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, regular mail, as authorized by the order to show cause, was
employed; and (3) that although service was made within the stipulated
time, service after the ten-day statutory period is a jurisdictional de-
fect.18 3 In answering the defendants' first objection, the Supreme Court,
Westchester County, relied on Knickerbocker, and concluded that the
defendants' counsel had not avoided the applicability of that decision
by deleting from his demand for arbitration the statement that the rules
of the American Arbitration Association permitting service of all papers
upon the attorney would apply and by expressly stating that only the
provisions of CPLR 7503 and other statutes relating to the initiation
of arbitration proceedings applied.8 4 Relying on Robinson v. City of
New York, 1 5 the court further held that the defendants' attorney's sug-
gestion that the plaintiff delay in making its application to stay arbitra-
tion estopped them from objecting to the time and method of service
of the application.18 In addition, the court followed 1'87 Liberty Mutual
180 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.YS.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Rlv. 498, 532 (1969).
18128 N.Y.2d at 65, 268 N.E.2d at 762, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
1382 69 Misc. 2d 350, 329 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Count , 1972).
183 Id. at 351, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
1384 Id. at 352, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
1835 24 App. Div. 2d 260, 265 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Ist Dep't 1965), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 41 ST. JoHN's L. Rlv. 121, 127 (1966).
186 69 Misc. 2d at 353, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 988. In so deciding, the court distinguished
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 758, 768 (1970), which held that a notice of motion served pursuant to CPLR 7503
after the ten-day period was invalid notwithstanding the plaintiff's reliance on an agree-
ment to extend the time for service.
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Insurance Co. v. Keane, s8 which held that ordinary mail fulfills the
purpose of CPLR 7503 absent any claim or proof of prejudice.
Allstate, properly applying the doctrine of estoppel in accordance
with well-settled principles, 89 precludes a morass of technical obstruc-
tions to the arbitration procedure. Additionally, it is noteworthy that
the Judicial Conference has recently proposed that the time period in
CPLR 7503(c) be amended to allow twenty days in which to move for a
stay of arbitration. 90
ARTICLE 80- Frx, s
CPLR 8012(b): Sheriff held entitled to full poundage fee when he de-
layed collection upon request.
Under CPLR 8012(b), a sheriff's poundage fee is based upon a
percentage of the amount actually collected.19' There are several excep-
tions to the general rule. Where there is a settlement after a levy, a
sheriff is entitled to poundage based upon the value of the property
levied on, but the amount obtainable cannot exceed the sum of settle-
ment. Also, where an execution is vacated, a sheriff is entitled to pound-
age limited to the amount specified in the execution. A third exception
applies where the sheriff has been hindered in the collection process. 92
In Nevada Bank of Commerce v. 43rd Street Estates Corp.,93 the
plaintiff instituted a tort action against the defendants, the guarantors
of a debt of another Nevada corporation. The sheriff levied against cer-
tain assets of the corporate defendant which were sufficient to satisfy a
default judgment of $956,668. After the sheriff was urged not to take
any further action, a Nevada bankruptcy proceeding led to a settlement
which enabled the primary obligor to satisfy the debt owed to the plain-
tiff and thereby terminated the defendants' liability. Eventually, the
plaintiff and the corporate defendant arranged a satisfaction and dis-
charge of the attachment for a sum of $1000. The issue of the case was
which sum should be used in ascertaining the poundage fee of the
sheriff - $1000 or $956,668.
187 69 Misc. 2d at 353, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
188 157 N.Y.L.J. 43, March 6, 1967, at 21, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County).
189 See Robinson v. City of New York, 24 App. Div. 2d 260, 265 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Ist Dep't
1965) and cases cited therein.
190 JuDICiAL Cos rERNcE oF TIE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN
RELATION TO THE CviL PRACnCE LAW AND RULES AND PRoposED AMENDMENTS PuRSUANT TO
SECTION 229 OF THE JUDICIAlY LAW 80 (1972).
191 For a general discussion of poundage fees, see 8 WK&M 8012.03-.09.
192 See Flack v. State, 95 N.Y. 461, 466 (1884); Esselsteyn v. Union Sur. & Guar.
Co., 82 App. Div. 474, 81 N.YS. 532 (2d Dep't 1903).
193 38 App. Div. 2d 227, 328 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1972).
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